Acceptable accident risk can vary from:

In the sample RAC matrix, risk for a ID hazard is approximately the same as for a IIIA hazard.

Some common exposure intervals include:

An ISO Risk contour on a log-log plot is a rectangular hyperbola in which Severity times probability is constant.

The impact of a single accident to the mission is highest for:

A top-down analysis starts with the outcome and progresses to the causes.

Energy Flow / Barrier Analysis is a top down analysis technique.

In Energy Flow / Barrier Analysis, a lockout/ tagout procedure is considered a type of barrier.

Risk is a long term expected value of loss.

Some type of design selection or design alteration is the only way to decrease severity of a hazard.

The risk from a particular hazard may change from one mission phase to the next, and may be different from one asset to another asset.

A functional hazard analysis is a bottom-up technique like a conceptual FMEA examining the failure modes of functions rather than of hardware.

When a system has redundant protection features, common cause analysis is important.

PHA and FMEA are powerful analysis tools to evaluate the combined effects of coexisting failures.

The SHA examines external interfaces, interfaces between subsystems, and system compliance with safety design requirements, among other things.

A checklist is a good way to identify hazards.

All failures are faults, but not all faults are caused by failures.

A fault tree sensitivity test determines if a component failure has a big impact on P top.

If a fault tree has the same component failure mode in more than one place, it indicates:

Given a constant failure rate during the duration of a mission:

Changing the order of decision points in an event tree has which of the consequences:

The preferred method of obtaining failure data is from published tables such as IEEE standard 500, MIL STD 464, or GIDEP.

Sneak circuit search methods are often applied only after observing bewildering system behavior without component failures.

Software Criticality Matrix defines level of rigor needed in software testing based on the probability and severity of the hazard.

Making a decision unsupported by available information is which kind of error:

Performing the correct step on the wrong item is which kind of error.

Methods to control operator error probability include:

Risk acceptance decisions should be made in real time by safety engineers as soon as countermeasures are identified and adopted for use

Risk acceptance decisions should consider

Tagging minimum cut sets with their appropriate vulnerabilities is a good way to identify common cause problems.

Cause Consequence Analysis is a graphical technique to depict an event tree.

Markov Analysis is valuable when:

For an inclusive OR gate with 2 inputs, the probability is P_a + P_b – [P_a * P_b], but a simplified approximation is P_a + P_b.